On the Iranian War

The results of the Iranian war are now only preliminary. And yet, we can already make a general estimate of where the things are turning:

1. The Crowd-made Conscience is a harlot bold. People love winners, and hate losers. When Iran was seen as a weaker, losing side of the conflict, it was a target of the most extreme, and the most exaggerated public attacks. Now, when Iran is (correctly) understood as the winner, you must expect that the public opinion, in the United States, and otherwise, will be adjusting accordingly.

The ‘Evil Islamic Regime’ was seen as such only as long as it was perceived as hapless. Once it has demonstrated viability, public figures will start discovering it had never been so bad all along. Which means that the earlier attacks/public criticism of it, had rarely been genuine all along. When people were implying that Iran is evil, what they actually meant is that it is weak, hapless.

As a result of this war, Iran has demonstrated far more robustness and viability, than pretty much anyone (including myself) had expected. I, personally, was surprised. And that means that the status and the international standing of Iran will be changing. If it was weak, it could be treated as a ‘rogue state’, essentially as a gang of bandits. Once it has made the superpower to back off, it cannot be seen as such any longer, and will be treated as a legitimate party.

2. It is, however, interesting to question why could Iran beat everyone’s expectations (including mine). I would even narrow this question down: why could it beat everyone’s expectations specifically in the conflict with the United States. I think one reason could be: hubris delta. When you are winning, and winning, and winning, and easily beating everyone receiving no effective pushback - like the United States had been winning globally (and Russia, in the post Soviet space!), you develop exaggerated idea of your own powers, and - at the same time - exaggerated contempt to pretty much everyone else.

And that is wrong. Because the chain of defeats, or rather, a chain of humiliations, does often cause a stimulating effect on the humiliated party. See Putin’s mistake in Ukraine. He had been publicly humiliating it for eight years, without finishing it. As a result, the Ukrainian military machine evolved. Defeats and humiliations had a stimulating effect.

I have a strong reason to believe, that the hardships and humiliations of the preceding years, and decades, caused a significant stimulating effect on the Iranian military and industrial machine. The Western media mocked them as hapless buffoons, while in fact the Iranians were making multiple decisions and microdecisions that were fundamentally correct, and would make them very much more robust in a major military conflict. And yet, the American public opinion (and the public opinion matters) did not grasp the nature of this progress.

I, personally, incline to an idea that the Iranian political leadership has a far better understanding of the economics of warfare (specifically, of their industrial applications) than the American one does. And, in a protracted conflict, that is the thing that matters. You don’t just need to produce the stuff that will work sufficiently well. You need to produce lots of it, and produce it cheap. Iranians understand this idea - and its practical implications. Americans, not so much.

That is why Iran can wage, and win a war with very limited resources

3. Iranian victory in this war, is largely a result of the United States backing off, while they could, theoretically speaking, continue to press forward. In fact, many political regimes all over the world would do exactly that. They may have been dragged into the war, based on faulty and misrepresented information, and then keep pressing forward, because they see no alternative.

The American decision, on the other hand, shows a great capacity for self-correction, far more than you could normally expect. The political leadership has to back off, because it feels the domestic political pressure, and it at the same time can back off, because the loss of power (= pretty much guaranteed in case of defeat) is no great catastrophe. That Trump, Vance, and others chose to back off suggests that they, all of them, are ready to step down.

If the idea of stepping down was absolutely unacceptable (like it is for the Russian leadership, for example), the White Housers would keep throwing more and more men and resources into the fire of war, hoping to extract some sort of a victory. (exactly like Putin is doing).

In this light, the rumours about the demise of the American democracy seem to be greatly exaggerated. Part of what defines autocracy, is that you cannot step down, this option does not exist, they will tear you to pieces. And, as stepping down is not an option, you can never admit a defeat, and never do self-correction. America is far, very far from this state of affairs, yet.

Implication: do not prosecute Trumps and Trumpists, when they step down, or be very cautious with such prosecutions. If you put them to jail, you will not so much deter any future political leadership from doing crimes, as you will deter them from stepping down from power. That is why, you must abstain from revenge, when these guys will be leaving the office.

4. This war, and the Iranian victory in this war - will have massive reverberations, both in the world, and in the United States. For the United States, its reverberations are going to be positive. Fundamentally, losing to Iran is a good thing for America. And the primary reason for that is not that the Iranian regime/system is better (no, actually the American one is nicer), but that in the absence of an effective pushback the American system is going nuts. That is a real problem.

And that is a major reason why America under-punched in this war, not meeting almost everyone’s expectations. You see, America, or a great part of America, did not want to win. It wanted to lose. And the reason they wanted to lose is not that they are secretly pro-Iranian or bribed by Tehran - almost all the accusations in foreign collusion are false - but because they wanted some sort of pushback, wanted some sort of external boundary to their own actions.

And that is a very interesting thing to think about. Because of all the major pretenders for the global hegemony in the past centuries - Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Russia, Japan or others - America made the most hesitant, the most reluctant global hegemon of all. The imperial expansion, the conquests overseas, the growth of the government apparatus associated with foreign wars etc, has been always seen with deep suspicion, and at times - fear.

What is particularly striking about the American empire is not that it is unpopular abroad, among the coloured races, who feel sort of suppressed by it (that is understandable). What is interesting, and unusual is that it is unpopular among its own population, that feels remarkably little enthusiasm about any sort of foreign victories or whatever. Many times less, than in any European colonial power of old.

I think that the primary reason for that is that America is, fundamentally, a republic. And its own core population is committed to seeing it as a republic, wants to remain a republic, enjoys being a republic. Now that creates a problem for the domestic political image of the American empire, making the latter deeply unpopular. For the people feel, even if they cannot formulate it explicitly, that having an empire is, in the long run, incompatible with being a republic.